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Rector, 
fellow professors of the university and colleagues,
ladies and gentlemen,
It is with great pleasure that I accept the position of endowed professor of Financial 
Infrastructure and Systemic Risk at the University of Tilburg with the inaugural address 
entitled ‘What is happening in Scrooge Digiduck’s warehouse?’1
As economic students learn very early on in their studies, money has three functions: it 
serves as a unit of account, as a store of value and as a medium of exchange. They then 
learn why money as an intermediate step is so much more useful than pure bartering. The 
person who has a sheep but wants bread must search for someone with exactly the oppo-
site need. In economics, this is referred to as the ‘double coincidence of wants’ and this is 
roughly how the function of money as a medium of exchange is dealt with in lectures. But 
in the literature as well, we only encounter the medium of exchange function of money to 
a limited extent.2 Generally, money as a medium of exchange is simply ignored. In eco-
nomics, therefore, too little attention is paid to this function; this is understandable, but 
not a good thing.
It is understandable because this function is largely carried out behind the scenes. It is 
embodied in the financial infrastructure. Later, I will provide a formal definition of the 
financial infrastructure, but first a definition that all of you as hands-on experts have with 
every infrastructure: a network that you use without further thought as long as it works, 
but which is very annoying when it does not. There are plenty of examples: the internet 
connection that is suddenly very slow, the electricity network that shuts off the power for 
several hours or the POS terminal that refuses your debit card. Let’s say that, 99% of the 
time, you can assume that the network will do what it is supposed to do. Furthermore, 
the service supplied by the network is basic in nature and, for this reason, not very excit-
ing. I know of very few people who regard the activity of making payments itself as an 
interesting one, apart from colleagues from the Cash and payment systems Division of De 
Nederlandsche Bank.
1  With thanks to Lex Hoogduin, Coen Voormeulen and colleagues from the Oversight Department for their 
useful comments on an earlier version of this speech.
2  Research output by central banks in this field is rapidly growing, however. See, for example, the Payment 
Economics Network (www.ecb.int).  
4 What is happening in Scrooge Digiduck’s warehouse?
Nevertheless, it is not a good thing to pay little attention to the final 1%, because infra-
structure that is affected by a disruption can have major implications for society. It is no 
different for the financial infrastructure. If money is temporarily unable to fulfil the func-
tion of a medium of exchange, it will not be possible to transfer value in the economy and 
no financial transactions can be settled. Greenspan [4]3 articulated this in his autobiogra-
phy, when he wrote about ‘11 September 2001’ as follows: “We’d always thought that if you 
wanted to cripple the U.S. economy, you’d take out the payment systems. Banks would be 
forced to fall back on inefficient physical transfers of money. Businesses would resort to 
barter and IOUs; the level of economic activity across the country would drop like a rock.”
In this speech, I will first talk about how the financial infrastructure is structured for the 
euro and the euro area. I will then address the implications of a failure of the financial 
infrastructure and the preventative measures that have been and will be taken. We will 
then focus our attention on the consolidation and the market regulation of the financial 
infrastructure. Finally, I will end this speech with a look far into the future of the financial 
infrastructure for the euro area. 
A guided tour around  
Scrooge Digiduck’s warehouse   It’s time now to introduce you 
to Scrooge Digiduck. When the printer was preparing the invitations for this speech, he 
asked me anxiously whether I did not mean McDuck instead of Digiduck. I reassured 
him: it was not a printing error, but the two gentlemen are related. As we know, Scrooge 
McDuck, the immensely wealthy duck from Duckburg, lives in a warehouse full of bank-
notes and coins, in which he likes to swim. Scrooge Digiduck is the digital brother of 
Scrooge McDuck and manager of a warehouse that is also full to capacity with money, but 
in this case, non-cash money. Unfortunately, you can’t touch non-cash money, let alone 
swim in them. The defining characteristic of non-cash money is that it only exists in the 
form of a credit on an account that an account holder holds with his or her bank. All of 
the accounts together form the account book, which includes all of the credit balances. 
Transfer of value takes place by debiting an amount to the payer’s balance and then credit-
ing it to the payee’s balance. The value of non-cash money therefore only exists in book 
entry form.
3  References to the literature are given in square brackets and are listed at the end of the text.
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Figure 1 Scrooge Digiduck’s warehouse
It’s high time we entered the warehouse because Scrooge Digiduck has been eagerly wait-
ing to give us a guided tour for some time. Immediately, we notice that the warehouse is 
only three floors high (see Figure 1), but it includes all 17 countries in the euro area.4 At 
the end of 2009, the value stored in the warehouse was over EUR 36,000 billion. Almost 
EUR 5,500 billion flows through it daily; this means that a value equal to the gross domes-
tic product of the euro area is processed every two days.
4  The infrastructures shown are taken from [6). With thanks to Richard Heuver for his invaluable assistance 
with producing the graphics.
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Figure 2 Retail payments in the euro area (simplified diagram)
We enter the ground floor and come to retail payments. Retail payments are the payments 
that everyone in the economy comes into contact with on a daily basis (see Figure 2). They 
include all payments made by consumers and businesses, using a range of different pay-
ment products: direct debits, credit transfers, card payments (debit or credit cards), pre-
paid cards, and internet payments, such as iDeal and Paypal. At the end of 2009, a total 
of approximately EUR 4,100 billion of non-cash money was held on current accounts.5 
Digiduck always uses this figure to torment McDuck because there is a lot more non-cash 
money than there are euro notes and coins (EUR 829 billion). There is a rumour that the 
notes and coins are stored in the cellar of the warehouse. McDuck torments him back by 
saying that he would rather be the owner of part of this than merely the manager of the 
entire warehouse. Well, that’s enough of this rivalry.
5  The statistics for the euro area in this speech are from the Statistical Data Warehouse, www.ecb.int, and 
relate to 2009.
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As the Dutch proverb goes: ‘money should circulate’, and it does. In the case of retail 
payments in the euro area, we are talking about a flow of about EUR 60 billion per day. 
Looking around this floor, we see a fragmented picture. In most countries, the infrastruc-
ture is tailored to the domestic situation. Take the Netherlands, for example. A section of 
the warehouse is actually here: those of you sitting in the audience have an average of two 
payment cards in your wallet, and many of you have a card reader at home or a mobile 
that you can use to create one-time passwords for internet banking. There are also 8,000 
ATMs and 259,000 POS terminals in the Netherlands that you can use to make debit card 
payments. In the euro area, there are about 28 types of debit cards and 6 types of credit 
cards in circulation. A payment can be initiated using all of the payment products referred 
to here. These are what are called one-sided financial transactions, because only one side 
is financial in nature. For payment products where verification of sufficient funds needs 
to be carried out on the spot (such as in the case of debit card payments in a store), a 
check needs to be carried out between the bank of the retailer (acquirer) and the bank of 
the customer (issuer). To this end  a ‘switch’ is used: a central piece of infrastructure that 
Scrooge Digiduck uses, as a digital payment agent, to route the information stream along 
the right paths.6 This keeps him pretty busy, particularly in December. In the Netherlands, 
in the days running up to St Nicholas’ Eve (5 December) and Christmas, between 2 p.m. 
and 3 p.m. local time, he routes 400 streams per second in the right direction. These 
requests for payment then come together with almost all of the other payment instruc-
tions into a single system that clears retail payments in the Netherlands. Such an infra-
structure is referred to as a ‘retail payment system’ or ‘automated clearing house’ (ACH). 
In the euro area, there are about 20 ACHs in total. In the Netherlands, this role has been 
fulfilled by Equens for a long time. In this context, clearing refers to, in the retail payment 
system, the determination of the amount each bank has to pay on behalf of its customers 
to each other bank and how much money each bank should receive for its customers from 
each other bank (gross). In the case of the Netherlands, there are about 17 million inter-
bank transactions per day and Equens clears at least every 30 minutes. Apart from clear-
ing, netting can also be carried out: the immediate setting off of amounts that are payable 
by one party to another and vice versa (net). Particularly in the case of large numbers of 
transactions within a limited group, it is often possible to net off a significant part of the 
originally payable amounts.
Suddenly, we hear the noise of hammer drills. They make such a racket that our guide 
becomes virtually inaudible. Digiduck apologises for the extensive building alteration 
works. He points to a sign saying ‘Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) 2012-2104’, and 
6  If the consumer and the retailer are with the same bank, the bank can carry out the payment internally (an 
'on us payment').
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promises us more information about this later. Our guide sees someone raising their 
hand. The person wonders, even after swiping the debit card, switching, clearing and net-
ting, is it true that payment has not yet actually been carried out? Digiduck nods in agree-
ment and replies that, for this, we need to go to the first floor of the warehouse: large-
value payment systems.
Figure 3 Large-value payment systems in the euro area (simplified diagram)
Large-value payments (see Figure 3) are payments for large amounts between banks, for 
themselves and for their customers. This can be divided into two categories. The first cat-
egory is correspondent banking. A correspondent banking payment is a payment between 
two banks that is made through an intermediary (the correspondent bank). This payment 
method was very common with foreign currency payments. As a result of the introduction 
of the euro and in the wake of the financial crisis, there has been evidence of a decline in 
corresponding banking payments. This is because the second category is becoming more 
important: central infrastructure payments. Digiduck says that EUR 2,900 billion changes 
hands daily in large-value payment systems. Rapid inspection of this floor reveals that 
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there are only three rooms, which are also interlinked. It is also clear that the major build-
ing alterations here are already finished. Digiduck points proudly to the modern, brand-
new layout of the room where TARGET27 operates, the payment system of the central 
banks in the euro area, which has been fully operational since May 2008. This system is 
used to execute the monetary policy transactions of the Eurosystem [6] and to carry out 
payments between about 4,500 banks in the euro area where payment can be made using 
money of the national central banks and the European Central Bank. This type of money 
is central bank money, which is ideally suited for such large amounts because, in practical 
terms, a central bank cannot fail. A second important feature of TARGET2 is immediate 
settlement, in real time, of individual payments. These systems are therefore referred to 
by the term ‘Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS)’. Settlement is the step in the payment 
chain when transfer of ownership takes place, the ‘real payment’, by debiting one account 
and crediting another account with the same amount.
A second system that is housed on this first floor is EURO1. This system also settles large-
value payments between banks on a European scale and is a private initiative of more than 
60 major European banks. EURO1 and TARGET2 are interlinked because EURO1 settles in 
TARGET2. This third room is occupied by CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement), the global 
payment system in which foreign exchange transactions are settled. This warehouse only 
houses the euro part of CLS: it deals with two-sided financial transactions, with the most 
frequent currency pair being euro/dollar. Here, Digiduck asks you to recall the netting of 
payments that he mentioned during the discussion on the ground floor, for CLS is a won-
derful example of the positive value of netting: it reduces the volume of liquidity required. 
On an average day, if we total all of the currencies and convert them into US dollars, CLS 
needs to settle about USD 3,000 billion gross between about 50 banks. However, net-
ting makes it possible to cancel out 99% of the value, so that, on a net basis, only about 
USD 30 billion of liquidity needs to be injected, i.e. an average of USD 600 million per 
bank. For a large bank, that is not an unusually large amount to be paid in a single sum 
through a large-value payment system. This advantage becomes even greater in absolute 
terms on peak days in CLS; the gross record on a single day was USD 10,000 billion.
7 TARGET2 stands for Trans-european Automated Real-time Gross Express Transfer, and the suffix 2 refers to 
the second generation. The first generation of TARGET was launched when the euro was introduced, on 1 January 
1999, when the existing national systems were made interoperable.
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Digiduck now refers to the earlier questions about where Dutch retail payments (you 
know, the one on the ground floor) are ultimately paid. The answer to this is in TARGET2, 
with a frequency of at least once every 30 minutes. TARGET2 is therefore not only used for 
interbank payments, but also as a settlement system for the clearing of retail payments. 
This is a good example of a link between two infrastructures, in this case, between the 
automated clearing house Equens and TARGET2. Such links between the ground floor and 
the first floor occur frequently, given that over 30 retail payment systems in the euro area 
settle in TARGET2.
Figure 4 Securities in the euro area (simplified diagram)
Scrooge Digiduck points to the approximately 20 cables that disappear into the ceil-
ing: there are also many links between the first and second floors. We go up to the sec-
ond floor of the warehouse (see Figure 4), which means we leave the world of non-cash 
money and enter the world of securities. This must be the most dynamic floor, because 
there is still a lot of building work going on here. At the end of 2009, this floor contained 
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EUR 30,700 billion of securities, shares and bonds that were in issue in the euro area, and 
of this figure, EUR 2,500 billion changed hands every day. Derivatives trading and clearing, 
which involve the circulation of even larger amounts, have been excluded here for the sake 
of simplicity. 
The securities chain involves transactions executed on stock exchanges and multilateral 
trading platforms (MTF), but also transactions that are entered into directly between two 
financial parties (over the counter, OTC). Digiduck suggests that we familiarise ourselves 
with the securities chain by following one transaction: a purchase of shares on the stock 
exchange. In this case, the securities chain starts with the stock market trade, where the 
buyer and seller are matched. This is a two-sided transaction. The transaction is con-
firmed and then cleared. In some cases, this may be done by a central counterparty (CCP) 
and then the securities side is settled in a central securities depository (CSD) and the 
money side is settled in the RTGS. The CSD changes the ownership of the shares from 
the seller to the buyer, and exactly the opposite happens for the money in the RTGS. The 
shares are held via banks, which in turn place the shares in the custody of a central securi-
ties depository (CSD)8. In the securities chain, there are therefore various types of infra-
structure in operation: stock exchange, MTF, CCP, CSD and RTGS.
In the case of securities trading, we are familiar with MTFs and the stock exchange, which 
previously had a trading floor, but now the trading is via screens or even without human 
intervention. In the case of off-exchange trading (OTC) in derivatives, a new type of infra-
structure has recently emerged: the trade repository. However, Digiduck thinks that the 
name ‘trade warehouse’ is far more appropriate. Worldwide, there are now three of these 
trade warehouses in operation, and two more are currently planned. The function of such 
a warehouse is to collect off-exchange transactions in one location and to make the posi-
tions taken by the various trading parties transparent.
The second function in the securities chain is clearing. In terms of function, this clearing 
is similar to clearing in the case of retail payments, although here it involves the matching 
and determining the amount of securities to be bought and to be sold for each counter-
party. But generally there is an additional function: that of a central counterparty (CCP). 
A central counterparty gives its members a guarantee (under certain conditions) that the 
securities receivable by the buyer will actually be delivered, even in the extreme case of 
failure of the original party with whom the securities are traded. The central counterparty 
thereby fulfils an insurance role for the failure of a member during the period from when 
8 The settlement function of securities takes place in a securities settlement system (SSS), which is generally 
part of a CSD. For the sake of simplicity, only a CSD is referred to here.
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a trade is entered into and its settlement. For exchange transactions, the period is usually 
three days, which is referred to as T+3.
The third function is the settlement of securities. The infrastructure that is used for this 
function is the CSD. Within the CSD, the actual transfer of value takes place against a 
modern version of  ‘paying in cash’, referred to as delivery versus payment (DVP). For 
this to happen, a link is needed between the second and the first floors of the warehouse, 
between CSD and RTGS. The concept is simple: the transfer of the securities in the CSD 
is made conditional upon the transfer of funds in the RTGS and vice versa. If both condi-
tions are met, there is a simultaneous exchange.9 For this to happen, it is therefore neces-
sary that the process is a joint one and this also requires cooperation between the central 
bank and the CSD.
The second floor, however, is home to more than just securities settlement. In the same 
way that non-cash money is stored electronically in the form of balances on bank accounts 
with commercial banks and central banks, so securities are also stored with custodian 
banks and in CSDs. Previously, this custodial function was a physical one, in the form of a 
safe, where the securities were stored in paper form. In the near future, virtually all Dutch 
securities will be in dematerialised form.10
Digiduck admits that, unfortunately, the second floor still looks very unstructured and not 
very uniform. There are many rooms housing different parts of the infrastructure. Some 
rooms have high ceilings; they contain what is referred to as a ‘vertical silo’. This is the 
case if the stock exchange, CCP and CSD are controlled by the same financial group. In 
other rooms on this floor, there is a horizontal model, in which the securities chain can 
run through different infrastructures. There are 9 central counterparties in the euro area 
and still 24 CSDs continue to operate there. A further conspicuous feature of the floor is 
the very large building pit, right next to the place where the DVP process just described 
takes place. It will come as no surprise to the experts that the letters ‘TARGET2-Securities 
2014’ are written on it. There is also a room where building is taking place, in the corner 
where the collateral process is carried out, which is used, among other things, for the cre-
ation of central bank money. A sign saying ‘Collateral Central Bank Management (CCBM2) 
2013’ is there. Now we take the lift back down and go outside again. 
9 DVP can be structured to take place in different ways. In fact, DVP needs to be viewed in legal terms; the es-
sential point is that at no stage in the process is one of the two parties the legal owner of both the securities and 
the funds.
10 The date when all securities will be dematerialised or immobilized in the form of a global note, is 1 January 
2013. 
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Scrooge Digiduck announces that the tour of the warehouse is finished; he must begin the 
monitoring of the end-of-day processes next, because the settlement day is almost over.
A holistic approach to
settlement risk   We now come to the definition of the term ‘financial infra-
structure’. Clearly, Scrooge Digiduck’s warehouse is a metaphor for the financial infra-
structure, and Scrooge Digiduck is an imaginary digital figure who acts as the manager 
of the infrastructure. The term financial infrastructure is defined in three elements as fol-
lows:
1) The system of rules, governance and technical infrastructure that 2) is necessary for the 
accurate and timely settlement of financial transactions 3) entered into throughout the 
economy. 
Re 1) The infrastructure is a system of rules, governance and technical infrastructure. It is 
often thought that financial infrastructure only refers to the hardware and software used in 
systems, such as communication lines, data centres and terminals of settlement systems 
and banks. But this is only partly true. Defining and supervising the financial infrastruc-
ture relates in the first place to the rules and the governance. Rules in this context refer 
to all of the formal legislation and regulations, contractual provisions, but also generally 
accepted standards and market practices. A selection from the many rules: the General 
Banking Terms and Conditions, which you as a consumer are given when you open a 
new bank account; the rulebooks of central systems, which may be many pages long; 
the Dutch Financial Supervision Act, international oversight standards for infrastructures. 
Then we come to the governance of the financial infrastructure. This needs to be carried 
out by a legal entity, the governance authority, which is responsible for compliance with 
the rules, the revision of its own rules and proper management of the part of the finan-
cial infrastructure to which the responsibility applies. This may involve public institutions 
such as central banks, but private bodies, which in turn are often owned by banks, may 
also serve as a governance authority.
Re 2) This concerns the timely settlement of financial transactions. A financial transaction 
refers to a transaction where at least one side is financial in nature (such as the purchase 
of a loaf of bread). In the case of a two-sided financial transaction, both sides are financial 
(such as the purchase of a bond). As soon as a financial transaction has been entered into 
but has not yet been settled, the party that needs to receive the financial side is exposed 
to settlement risk. Roughly speaking, settlement risk (in a broad sense) can be divided 
into the following three subcategories [1]. First, there is principal risk: the risk that the 
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counterparty will not deliver the financial value at all (such as in the case of failure of that 
counterparty). Second, there is liquidity risk: the risk that the counterparty will deliver the 
financial value too late, or at least later than agreed in the contract. In this case, the party 
that expects the liquidity at a particular time has a lower cash position than expected. The 
third and final element of settlement risk consists of ‘replacement cost risk’, and this only 
applies to two-sided transactions. This is the risk that a different asset will be delivered to 
what has been agreed (for example, a different currency). In order to obtain the original 
asset, additional costs then need to be incurred relative to what would have been the case 
had the transaction been settled correctly, for example, because the exchange rate of the 
original currency has risen in the interim. The timely settlement of financial obligations 
ensures that settlement risk is prevented.
Re 3) The final element of the definition of financial infrastructure concerns financial trans-
actions throughout the economy. This means that it is a macroeconomic phenomenon 
and emphasises the complementary function: the financial infrastructure does not have 
an independent objective, but functions for the economy as a whole. When we study the 
financial infrastructure, we see the economy as the generator of settlement risk exposures 
(exogenous), but we view the changing and elimination of the set of settlement risk expo-
sures as endogenous [1]. With this explanation of the term financial infrastructure, we 
come to the essence of the chair in financial infrastructure and systemic risk. The central 
problem that I will research can be summarised as follows: given the set of settlement risk 
exposures in an economy, how can these exposures be eliminated securely and efficiently? 
This involves a holistic approach by viewing the financial infrastructure as a whole, i.e. as 
if it were one warehouse, as I have attempted to describe it above, and not as a loose col-
lection of banks, settlement systems and other economic agents. This is justified by the 
increased interdependencies [5] on and between the different floors of the warehouse. In 
other words, how must Scrooge Digiduck’s warehouse be structured?
Infrastructure-related 
systemic risk   In my view, the way that the financial infrastructure should 
be structured must hinge on the question of whether systemic risk can occur, and if so, 
where? I will first address the term ‘systemic risk’. Systemic risk refers to the risk of major 
financial instability with substantial negative consequences for the financial sector and 
the rest of the economy [7]. In this context, ‘system’ therefore refers to the economy 
as a whole and is consistent with the systemic risk concept of the brand-new European 
Systemic Risk Board. As a result of the financial crisis, which has proliferated in all sorts 
of forms since August 2007, the phenomenon of systemic risk has become all too clear. 
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The chair is concerned specifically with the relationship between the financial infrastruc-
ture and systemic risk. I refer to this as infrastructure-related systemic risk: the compo-
nent of systemic risk that can be brought about by the improper functioning of the finan-
cial infrastructure, or where the financial infrastructure acts as the conduit for shocks that 
have arisen elsewhere. Given the macro nature of systemic risk, it then relates to large-
value payments and securities transactions. The systemic risk inherent in the financial 
infrastructure for the euro and the euro area is therefore localised on the first and second 
floors of the warehouse.
Incidentally, this does not mean that the ground floor is always secure. It means that there 
is no systemic risk inherent in retail payments, but that there is the risk of social unrest if 
the problems escalate [2]. For instance, if ATMs and POS terminals do not function on a 
large scale in our country, or if there is cybercrime in retail payments. This will manifest 
itself in long queues in front of ATMs and problems in stores where it is no longer pos-
sible to make payment by debit card. In September and December 2010, a number of dis-
ruptions affected debit card payments in the Netherlands for a very short period of time, 
and in each case for no longer than 30 minutes. Nevertheless, 15 minutes after the start of 
the failure, reports of it were already on the internet and were buzzing around the social 
media. What is more, as a result of modern communications, the public perception of a 
failure - even if everything is running normally - is sufficient to give rise to some concern. 
In August of last year, the news that ‘you can use your debit card for free’ was enough to 
cause a run on a number of ATMs. Using a debit card is, of course, never free, because the 
cash amount of money was also then simply deducted from the bank account.
Now back to the inherent, infrastructure-related systemic risk. This raises the question 
about the systemic risk that could manifest in the financial infrastructure if no precaution-
ary measures are taken. You can compare this type of risk with the risk of driving a car on 
a skid pan without wearing a safety belt. This is good as a thought experiment, but unwise 
in practice.
The first category of problems concerns failures in the financial infrastructure itself, with 
the most obvious being operational risks. As with every network sector in the economy, 
it is possible for technology to fail us, but natural disasters and terrorism can also mean 
that part of the infrastructure is not available for a particular period of time. Such failures 
result in systemic risk if they happen at critical periods, such as at the end of the set-
tlement day, during the day in the case of more protracted failures, or at times of great 
market uncertainty. In the case of a failure, settlement risk exposures can mount up and, 
within a day, can exceed the capital of each bank multiple times. In the case of a failure in 
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a RTGS, CCP or CSD, many banks will also face a system failure simultaneously. Moreover, 
an operational problem has the added complication of being unpredictable. This type of 
inherent infrastructure-related systemic risk originates from the inside and is therefore 
present on a permanent basis.
A second category of inherent infrastructure-related systemic risk is the risk of a bank 
failure. In this case, the settlement risk initially occurs in one bank because outgoing pay-
ments will no longer be made, but incoming payments will continue. The systemic risk 
can then manifest itself in the form of the feared domino effect: the initial problems lead 
to liquidity problems in other banks. Note that, in this case, the financial infrastructure 
does function correctly. This type of inherent infrastructure-related systemic risk origi-
nates from the outside and is therefore present if banks are at risk of getting into difficul-
ties, particularly in the case of problems with a bank that is systemically important.11
This raises the question of what measures have been taken in the financial infrastruc-
ture to mitigate the inherent infrastructure-related systemic risk. International minimum 
standards have been drawn up for this purpose, which the central infrastructure, such as 
RTGS, CCP and CSD must meet. These standards are multidisciplinary in nature. They 
refer, among other things, to a sound legal basis, effective control of settlement, opera-
tional and financial risks, fair access criteria and good governance.12 I will cover two exam-
ples here, one for each category of inherent infrastructure-related systemic risk referred 
to earlier. 
An example of mitigation of inside originated systemic risk is the standard that a service 
disruption must be solved the same day; an accepted assumption is a maximum outage 
of two hours. There must be sufficient back-up so that if a data centre is affected by a dis-
aster, the service can be resumed in another data centre that is not affected by the same 
disaster. The underlying principle is that the risk profiles of the two data centres must be 
sufficiently different so that one event cannot affect both centres. In practice, the target 
availability during normal opening hours is 99.5% or more.
11 The term 'systemically important financial institution' was recently defined by the Financial Stability Board 
and adopted by the G20 in November 2010.
12 These are referring to the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems of the Committee on 
Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS) from 2001 and the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Sys-
tems and for Central Counterparties, respectively, of the joint working group of the CPSS-IOSCO (International 
Organization for Securities Commissions) from 2001 and 2004, respectively.
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The second example, the control of outside originated systemic risk, is part of the stand-
ard for a sound legal basis in all of the jurisdictions in which the member banks of the 
settlement system are based. The principle is that the system must be final within the set-
tlement day. This means that if a member bank fails, the payment instructions processed 
by the system can no longer be reversed. Such a provision therefore breaches the general 
provision of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswet), according to which, upon the 
failure of a business entity, all acts by that entity on that day are to be reversed to the posi-
tion as at 12 midnight at the end of the preceding day. This provision is included in the 
European Settlement Finality Directive, thereby avoiding the need to have large numbers 
of settled transactions reversed, which would give rise to substantial uncertainty among 
all members of the system about the balances actually available to them at any time. Such 
final systems therefore provide for one-way traffic during the day: once transactions have 
been settled, they remain settled. This has the advantage for the creditor that the amount 
received in such a final system can be immediately available and reused.
Compliance with the standards referred to above is the responsibility of the governance 
authority of the financial infrastructure and is subject to oversight [3]. The overseers in 
the euro area are the national central banks and the ECB. There is also oversight of securi-
ties transactions by the securities regulators, which in the case of the Netherlands, are 
De Nederlandsche Bank and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets. I will 
not be covering this regulatory task in further detail in my speech.13 However, it should 
be noted that the total elimination of systemic risk is not possible because 100% security 
does not exist. Even if all of the measures have been taken, all standards have been com-
plied with, and there are no further findings by the overseer, there is always a residual risk.
We will leave the thought experiment and turn our attention back to the financial infra-
structure and all of the precautionary measures, and now examine the biggest test faced 
by the financial infrastructure in recent years: the period between September and October 
2008. During these two months, the infrastructure-related systemic risk was higher than 
normal. This was very apparent from the risk of failure of large players in the financial mar-
kets, the higher numbers of transactions that had to be processed by the financial infra-
structure, and the actual default of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. Fortunately, 
the infrastructure proved able to deal effectively with this dangerous cocktail of events 
and emerged without sustaining major damage. There was, of course, a higher degree 
of alertness in the form of extra monitoring, and non-urgent modifications of the infra-
structure’s software and hardware was deferred for several months. Operational capacity 
13 The extent of compliance with the oversight standards for the infrastructure that is relevant to the 
Netherlands is available at www.dnb.nl/en/payments/oversight
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proved to be sufficient to absorb peak values in transactions, and the financial buffers of 
central counterparties were high enough to absorb the collapse of Lehmans. During sub-
sequent periods of market unrest, the financial infrastructure has also proved to be suffi-
ciently robust. The impact of all of the failures of individual banks in recent years has been 
absorbed. Overall, the financial infrastructure has held up well, but it would be short-
sighted to conclude from this that the financial infrastructure is totally crisis-resistant. It 
is, therefore, good to be able to report that the international oversight standards referred 
to are currently being revised by an international working party. It is important that certain 
aspects of the standards are tightened up.
Market-driven consolidation?   Above, we have considered the 
layout of the warehouse with a view to mitigating systemic risk. Although it is the primary 
focus for the risk standards that have to be met, it is not the whole story. After all, it could 
then be argued that the resilience of the financial infrastructure must always be increased, 
regardless of the costs. An alternative balancing perspective is needed, and this is the 
efficiency argument. Ultimately, the infrastructure must be used by banks, companies and 
consumers in a cost-effective way. There is also, therefore, an international standard that 
embraces this principle precisely. Given a certain robustness, the warehouse must be laid 
out as efficiently as possible, so that the utility function or basic service – the elimination 
of settlement risk – can be delivered to the rest of the economy at the lowest possible 
cost. This excludes the wide range of possible additional services that can be provided, 
in some cases bundled with the basic service, such as extending credit, invoicing or out-
sourcing the entire back office.
We have now arrived at the well-known phenomena in economics of the positive external-
ity of a network and the economies of scale. I would like to illustrate this using the follow-
ing puzzle:14 
In a country far, far away lives King Greedy. He buys all sorts of things, mainly to make an 
impression on his subjects. His people are not allowed to buy the same item as the king within 
one month; it takes this long for the king to start to get tired of acquisition. His most recent 
purchases in random order are: fridge, camera, slippers, car, telephone and cactus. However, 
the king proclaimed that his subjects could purchase one of the items in the list immediately 
and what’s more, he virtually demanded that they do so as soon as possible. Which item was 
it?
14 Taken from puzzle no. 49 A Royal Show-off from Professor Layton and Pandora's Box.
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The king knows only too well that a network with a size of n = 1 has no value: one telephone 
(this is the correct solution) in a kingdom is of no use. Positive externality arises by adding 
one new member to the payment system, which also makes the system more valuable for 
the existing members. The feature of the infrastructure is also that there are increasing 
returns from scale. The costs of the financial infrastructure are largely fixed costs, which 
means that marginal costs are relatively low. For this reason, the financial infrastructure is 
always said to be a volume game: the more transactions that pass through the same plat-
form, the lower the costs per transaction. So, for the economy of the euro area as a whole, 
there are still substantial long-term efficiency gains to be made.
If the conditions for fair competition are met, it can be expected that in the long term, a 
single dominant infrastructure will be created. The one that is initially successful (for what-
ever reason) can reduce the costs through economies of scale and increase value by the 
network effect, thereby acquiring an ever larger market share. If we consider each country 
in the euro area individually, then the financial infrastructures for each basic function are 
often unique: one ACH, RTGS, CCP and CSD. In the Netherlands, the municipal giro serv-
ices of Arnhem, Amsterdam, Bussum and Zaandam and the Rotterdam Stock Exchange 
were ultimately merged into larger entities in the last century. It therefore seems that, 
sooner or later – somewhat counter-intuitively – if there is sufficient competition between 
the markets, the end result for basic services in the new common market will often be a 
monopoly rather than full competition. Incidentally, experience shows that it is generally 
later rather than earlier. Such a monopoly does not need to be problematic, as long as it 
is contestable: new entrants must be able to enter the monopolist’s market if they wish 
to and the margins on basic clearing and settlement services need to be modest. A very 
suitable business model would be one where the owners are users and which is geared 
toward cost recovery plus a small margin; the aim is not for Digiduck to become rich. 
Some argue that the euro area is too large for such a structure, but in the United States, 
the second floor of the dollar warehouse is heavily concentrated (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5 Securities in the United States (simplified diagram)
The conditions for such a market-driven consolidation have not yet been met, however, 
even though various initiatives have been started in recent years. In order to achieve a 
truly level playing field, at least three conditions need to be met.
  1) A high degree of standardisation for the whole chain, so that the positive network 
externalities and economies of scale can actually be achieved. The importance of pre-
cise, open standards cannot be emphasised enough, and must not be a subject of 
competition. Legislation in relation to such basic products would need to take stand-
ards that are widely accepted in the market as a starting point and where they are 
missing legislation should prescribe the development of such standards.
  2) The removal of cross-border legal barriers through the harmonisation of legislation 
at a national level and clear legislation at a European level. These barriers exist for the 
entire warehouse, but for the second floor, they have been known for the last decade 
as the Giovannini barriers, with examples being non-harmonised tax laws.
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  3) Vested interests must be broken up, because in the short term, there are always 
parties who benefit from the existing inefficiencies and then point to the high initial 
investment.
Incidentally, this does not mean that there should be no more competition in the entire 
warehouse in the long run. This might well need to be the case for additional services, 
such as in issuing and acquiring or custody services. I will not expand on this aspect here, 
because the more interesting question is how consolidation will take place. Assuming that 
consolidation will be market-driven, consolidation can be expected to take place through 
a combination of interoperability and mergers/acquisitions. Interoperability between two 
infrastructures means that a participant who is only a member of one infrastructure can 
still settle a transaction with a participant who is only a member of the other infrastruc-
ture.
The first example of consolidation by interoperability is that between central counterpar-
ties (CCPs) in Europe in relation to equity clearing. Although, from a risk perspective, 
the usual comments need to be made about the desirability of interoperability, I am only 
going to talk about the underlying reason here: five years ago, the European Commission 
and the securities industry agreed to introduce interoperable links. Two interoperable 
CCPs can each guarantee one of the two sides of a transaction via a link. As a result, 
counterparties only have to be a member of one interoperable CCP instead of a number 
of CCPs. In this way, they can save on membership costs and, overall, collateral costs as 
well. Given the competition between CCPs, it should come as no surprise that it is difficult 
to achieve interoperability. My expectation is that, at most, interoperability will be able to 
function as a catalyst to the consolidation of this category of CCPs on a temporary basis. 
It is more probable that consolidation will take place through mergers and acquisitions. 
In the somewhat longer term, interoperability between CCPs will disappear or become a 
marginal phenomenon.
A second example of consolidation is the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which means 
I am fulfilling Digiduck’s promise to return to the building alterations being carried out on 
the ground floor of the warehouse. SEPA is a large-scale restructuring of retail payments 
in the euro area, but also outside it, which is comparable to the launch of euro notes 
and coins. The fact is that the building alterations, which started several years ago, have 
become significantly delayed. To complete the building alterations, clearly defined stand-
ards need to be agreed for the whole chain, end-to-end. The existing standards for credit 
transfers and direct debits only apply to the interbank segment. Successful completion 
depends on the European regulations that are in the pipeline embracing these standards 
and prescribing that the bank-customer segment must also be standardised. In order to 
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be able to meet the third condition as well, a firm completion date needs to be set for the 
building alterations to ensure that they are finished. Another prerequisite for further con-
solidation is to make interoperability between all ACHs in Europe possible based upon a 
level playing field.
A third example is the building alterations on floor two, as promised, TARGET2-Securities 
and CCBM2. These projects were initiated by the Eurosystem. The aim is for TARGET2-
Securities to take over DVP securities settlement from all CSDs in Europe that want it, 
thereby killing two birds with one stone. Because TARGET2-Securities is a single DVP plat-
form, securities settlement is standardised and therefore a number of Giovannini barri-
ers are removed, but interoperability between all CSDs is also achieved, as it were, auto-
matically. This will then open the door to competition and consolidation of the settlement 
function of the CSDs in Europe with effect from 2014. Thereafter, we will be waiting for an 
initiative aimed at the further consolidation of the other functions of a CSD, such as the 
custody function. CCBM2 is the start of further harmonisation efforts to make the collat-
eral process more efficient in the euro area.
These examples show that quite a lot of work is being done and, given the lead time of 
about five years for major infrastructure projects in the warehouse, the layout of the ware-
house until 2015 is fairly clear. But, of course, you want to hear where it will all lead in the 
long term.
The ultimate warehouse   History teaches us that, when looking ahead 
into the distant future, it is wiser to predict that something is possible, rather than that 
something is impossible. You will therefore only hear from me what is possible in an ulti-
mate warehouse, but without specifying a year. However, I will make a number of assump-
tions, as is normal practice in economics. I will assume that, in the distant future, there is 
still a form of money in the economy; for fans of the original Star Trek this is, incidentally, 
a bold assumption.15 The currency of the euro area is still the euro and the euro area now 
includes more than 30 countries. And standards and European legislation in the field of 
infrastructure have been fully harmonised throughout the entire euro area. According to a 
descendant of Scrooge Digiduck, the position is as follows:
15 In the original Star Trek series, it turned out there was no further role for money on earth. Money only ap-
pears in the Star Trek Encyclopaedia as an intergalactic medium of exchange.
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1.  Full consolidation. The temporary phase of interoperability between ACHs, CCPs and 
CSDs is far behind us, and the wave of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions 
has run its full course. As a result, substantial efficiency gains have been recorded at the 
level of the euro area and the costs per transaction are among the lowest in the world.
2.  One ACH and one CSD. The ground floor has become very transparent: retail payments 
are cleared for the entire euro area in one ACH and are settled one floor higher in 
TARGET The Next Generation. There has also been substantial consolidation on the 
second floor, with the securities chain being structured by category of security and 
derivative. For equity  and fixed income, there is a single integrated trading platform 
and warehouse; and there is one CSD called Securities The Next Generation. 
3.  Settlement anywhere and at any time. The financial infrastructure is available 24/7. The 
instruction for money settlement or securities settlement is generated by your mobile 
general purpose device, which you can use, for example, to project a holographic POS 
terminal. The mobile telephone is, after all, an old-fashioned way of making payment in 
2015. 
4.  T+3 settlement. Transactions are recorded to the nearest nanosecond. Settlement at 
T+3 means three milliseconds later, instead of three days later. All payments and securi-
ties settlement are final within three milliseconds, and the assets can be reused imme-
diately throughout the entire euro area. This has resulted in a major reduction in settle-
ment risk exposures and, therefore, to infrastructure-related systemic risk.
5.  CCP for securities is redundant. The central counterparty for securities (but not for 
derivatives) has become redundant, because no guarantee function is needed for set-
tlement risk exposure that lasts a maximum of three milliseconds for end-to-end trans-
actions. For derivative transactions on trading platforms and for OTC, there is a maxi-
mum of one CCP per asset class, as a result of which the settlement risk exposure is 
more concentrated, but substantially reduced by netting.
6.  End of the settlement day. The term ‘settlement day’ is losing its meaning because 
there are no longer any technical or legal barriers to transfers in space or time. For this 
purpose, the 24/7 collateral pool was developed some time ago under the name CCBM 
The Next Generation. This also means the removal of the distinction between intraday 
and overnight credit. Interest will be calculated per second, and this ensures that con-
sumers and businesses hold liquid assets on an interest-bearing basis and settle by 
automatic sweeps between the settlement account and the savings or custody account.
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Conclusion   It is high time that we return to 2011 for three final comments.
First, in this inaugural address, I have argued for a holistic approach to the financial infra-
structure, both in terms of the internal structure of the warehouse and geographically. I 
have deliberately taken the warehouse at the euro-area level as the starting point, since 
the Netherlands and every other individual European country is too small to compete 
on a global scale. It is important that infrastructure-related systemic risk continues to be 
properly controlled.
Second, I have said that I expect that consolidation will be market-driven, but for this to 
happen, it is vital that a genuinely level playing field is created. I have set out the condi-
tions for this. Interoperability can play a useful role as a catalyst on a temporary basis, but 
ultimately mergers and acquisitions will be necessary for the permanent consolidation of 
the financial infrastructure in the euro area.
Third, I have outlined the ultimate warehouse. The intention behind this has been to show 
what could potentially become reality. The ultimate warehouse can serve as an alternative 
starting point for research and education. In the years to come, I will focus my research 
on issues such as the development of a functional model for the financial infrastructure 
as a whole, in accordance with the holistic approach outlined earlier. I recommend that 
this specialist field – because that’s what financial infrastructure can be described as – be 
given its own Journal of Economic Literature code, since the current coding is too limited. 
Education begins, of course, with the function of money as a medium of exchange and, 
thereafter, hopefully the entire financial infrastructure will be presented to students on a 
systematic basis.
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Professor Sylvester Eijffinger, ten years after your inaugural address at this university on 
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fallen after all. I look forward to working with you.
Professor Lex Hoogduin, in your inaugural address in Groningen that I attended, you cre-
ated a special animal in the finance and banking industry, the konifant. It will be a chal-
lenge for me to research the financial infrastructure’s konifant.
The members of the Governing Board of De Nederlandsche Bank, as sponsors of what is, 
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and, in particular, president Nout Wellink, who has fully supported the idea of the chair 
from the very beginning.
Professor Hennie Daniels, as your first PhD-student, I have had a tremendous time com-
bining the fields of economics and artificial intelligence. An experience that is an excellent 
fit for financial infrastructure. I look forward to resuming our lunchtime walks through the 
De Warande park.
Henny van der Wielen, you managed to persuade me that working for the Cash and pay-
ment systems Division was certainly as interesting as working for the Economics and 
research Division of the Bank. I admit that you were right about this.
Coen Voormeulen, after your move to the payments side of the Bank, you asked me about 
my ambitions. Your immediate response to my reply was that you would like to see me in 
a gown. Duly noted.
Colleagues in the Cash and payment systems Division, I would like to thank you for our 
many discussions in recent years, from which I have learned a great deal about the finan-
cial infrastructure.
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Dear Mum and dad, thank you for your support over many years; I am happy that you are 
here to see me fulfil my childhood dream.
My dear daughters, Caroline and Juliette, I would like to thank you for the binary version of 
Scrooge Digiduck and the King Greedy puzzle.
Dear Jacqueline, you are the one I can always rely on. It all began for us here in Tilburg, 
and I hope that it will continue for us for many more years yet.
         I have said.
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